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Battlefield Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

The Case for Restraint

Michael G. Vannoni

Gaurav Rajen and Michael G. Vannoni are, respectively, Consultant and Principal Member of Technical Staff, Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA.

India and Pakistan have developed and tested weapons with the stated intention of creating strategic deterrence with a minimum credible nuclear force. In spite of this, internal pressures in both nations to obtain the ability to fight a ‘limited nuclear war’ are increasing. Such a strategy would probably require a new class of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons. This article, focused primarily on India's dilemma with nuclear strategy, first surveys Indian and Pakistani academic and official statements on the utility of battlefield nuclear weapons, then demonstrates that the military utility of these weapons is very limited in the South Asian context. The article concludes that an India–Pakistan restraint regime for battlefield nuclear weapons is needed and explores how such a regime might be structured and monitored.

South Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 1, 91-104 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/097152310501200107


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